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TAX: EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

A CORPORATE QUANDRY: SEARCH FOR AN
ADEQUATE METHOD OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
LESTER A. KLAUS*
LEVELING CORPORATE TAxEs: RAISON D'ETRE FOR SOME

EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION PLANS

Management may have many reasons for the particular type
of executive compensation plan chosen, but certain to be one is
the leveling of corporate taxes. It is not the purport of this effort
to describe the extremely technical process of leveling corporate
taxes except to alert the reader that various executive compensation plans used in the past have served this end. Changes in form
of business association have occurred not only to take advantage
of the leveling devices, but also to utilize the tax favors granted
by certain compensation plans.
A business operated as a partnership with a high variable
income will throw its income into what might be the higher tax
brackets of its owners in extremely profitable years. Yet, the same
peak profits earned by a corporation can be leveled out for th6
individual stockholders by dividends, bonus plans, and accounting
methods. Corporate profits of an extremely good year may be
distributed as dividends over a number of years, thereby reducing
the income of shareholders currently in top brackets. Also, under
executive profit-sharing plans, corporate profits earned in peak
years can be prorated and paid over a period of several years.'
OB.S.B.A., LL.B., IL.M. (in taxation); Adjunct Professor of Taxation,
Oklahoma City University School of Law; associated with Fellers,
Snider, Bagger & McLane, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
'INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 162; Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1. Deductions of
contributions made by an employer under pension, annuity, stock bonus,
and profit-sharing is permitted within certain limits. Such contributions
are primarily in the nature of additional compensation for personal
services rendered by the covered employees and represent a business
expense. The plan (contribution) must show that it represents an ordinary and necessary expense paid or incurred in carrying on a trade
or business to be a legitimate business deduction. In order to be deductible under §404(a) plan contributions must be deductible either under
§162 (above) or under § 212 relating to expenses for the production
of income.
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Admittedly, there may be an apparent problem in the profit sharing plans because of the overlapping of accounting methods used
by the corporation and the individual. However, if the corporation
is on the accrual basis and the executive on the cash basis, year
end bonuses paid shortly after the end of the year may be deducted
by the corporation in the tax year ended and reported as income
in the year received in cash by the owner-executive.2 An accrual
basis taxpayer may take the deduction in the year the plan is
established. This is so, even if the "funding" of the plan does not
occur until after the current tax year, provided it is within the time
allowed for filing the return.3 Also, dividends covering the profits
for the current year may be declared at year end and paid to the
recipients in the following year. Moreover, interest may likewise
be deducted by the corporation in the year incurred (accrued) and
paid out early in the following year. In this case, the corporation
deducts the interest paid in the current year and the recipient
reports the income in the following year.'
2

INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 404 (a) (6); Treas. Reg. §§ 1A04(a)
-1(a) (1) - 1.404a)-1(c). A deduction for profit-sharing plans is
generally allowed only if the payment is actually made during the taxable years. However, contributions made by an accrual basis taxpayer,
after the close of the taxable year, to a qualified plan or trust may be
deducted if paid not later than the time prescribed by law for filing
the yearly return. For time extensions, see Rev. Rul. 55-670, 1955-2
CUM. BULL. 233, Rev. Rul. 56-674, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 293.
3
See Rev. Rul. 55-640, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 231. A written contract to
make contributions may constitute a "plan" corpus. This is true if under
local law, such a promise is binding without other consideration. See
also, Rev. Rul. 57-419, 1957 INT. REv. BULL. No 38, modifying
Mim. 5958, 1946-1 Cum. BULL. 72, in relation to filing a return.
4INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 461, 770 (a), regarding periodic accounting
treatment on cost and accrual basis. Deductions must be taken by a
taxpayer on the cash basis in the year in which the payment is made
or its equivalent. In Hehvering v.Price, 309 U.S. 409 (1940), a taxpayer's note was held not to be the equivalent of cash. So, if a cash
basis taxpayer gives his note in payment, he is not allowed the deduction until actual payment is made, even if secured by collateral. However, a taxpayer reporting on an accrual basis must take all the deductions at the time they accrue. Consequently, there must be an actual
liability incurred before any amount may be accrued. See also for cash
basis accounting and the discount method, Mass. Mut.Life Ins. Co. v.
United States, 288 U.S. 269 (1933), and Higginbothem-Bailey-Logan
Co., 8 B.T.A. 566 (1927).
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With the foregoing introduction setting the impending dis.
cussion in a proper tax perspective, we may now proceed to

analyze the judicial treatment of a unique management innovation
-

a deferred compensation unit plan.
JUDICIAL ANALYSIS -

SOMEWHAT MURKY

It is not unusual that the bulk of the pertinent case law to

be considered here was decided in Delaware, since that state is
the mecca of incorporation.
A corporate stockholder sued to enjoin the continued operation
of a "Deferred Compensation Unit Plan," on the ground that the
capital gains provision of the plan was not reasonably related to
the value of the services rendered by those included within it.'
Upon the death or retirement of a key executive, there was to be
credited to his "unit account" an amount equal to the net increment
in market value of one share of common stock, from the date the
"units" were assigned, multiplied by the number of "units" assigned. Payment of the amount was to be made over a ten-year
period following the executive's death or retirement. On cross
motions for summary judgment, the Court of Chancery, New
Castle, Delaware, held for the defendant where the court contended that it cannot be said that appreciation of the market price
of common stock is unrelated to the efforts of the individuals included within the plan.
Until recently, Berkwitz v.Humphrey was the only other case
which had been litigated testing the validity of the so-called "unit"
plans. It was concluded there that a plan almost identical to the
one in question, was per se invalid. It was reasoned that, since
the market price of common stock is subject to many extraneous
forces, i.e., fortunes of the economy, speculation, etc., there is no
reasonable relation between it and the value of a key executive's
services! In the Koppers case, however, it was pointed out that
earnings are the chief determinative factor of a stock's market
price, at least in the long run. There being no question that an
'Lieberman v. Koppers Co., 149 A.2d 756 (DeL Ch. 1959).
'163 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Ohio 1958).
7Id. at 86.
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executive's services are related to corporate earnings, the court
felt that it was unable to say that there is no relation between those
services and the market price of the corporation's stock.
The latter view seems to be the better one. Compensation
must be reasonably related to the value of an executive's services,
but the determination of what is reasonable is usually left to the
discretion and business judgment of the board of directors.8 In
order to prevail, therefore, the plaintiff should have to show that
a reasonable man would find the "unit" plan indefensible. Yet
the "unit" plan in not unlike stock option plans which have found
approval in the courts.! The financial reward in each plan is
identical, both being based on the increase of the market price
of the corporation's stock. It is difficult, therefore, to understand
why the "unit" plan is more unreasonable than a stock option
plan. In the opinion of this commentator, the view expressed in
Lieberman v. Koppers Co." is clearly justifiable.
The summary presentation just given was designed, more or
less, to acquaint the reader with the procedural manner in which
the unit plan has been contested, giving the courts the opportunity
to scrutinize the mechanics of its scheme.
DETAILED CHARACTERISTICS EXPLORED

A substantially novel method of deferred compensation for
corporate executives and other key employees, which would give
them many of the advantages of a stock option without having
to put up capital, was upheld by the Supreme Court of Delaware
in Liebermran v. Becker"against objections that it imposed unlimited liability on the company, and that it led to unreasonable
'Wyles v. Campbell, 77 F. Supp. 343, 349-351 (D. DeL 1948); Clamitz
v. Thatcher Mfg. Co., 158 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1947); Heller v. Boylan,
29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 680 (1941).

'Wyles v. Campbell, supra note 8; Claimitz v. Thatcher Mfg. Co., supra
note 8.

"Lieberman v. Koppers Co., supra note 5.
155 A.2d 596 (1959), affirming the summary judgment for the defendant granted by the Chancellor below in a derivative action to have
the plan declared invalid, to enjoin its operation and to render an
accounting, Lieberman v. Koppers Co., supranote 5.
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diversion of corporate assets due to its dependence on the price
of the stock on the [stock] market.
This so-called Deferred Compensation Unit Plan, adopted by
the Board of Directors and ratified by the majority of stockholders
of Koppers Company, is administered by a committee of three
or more directors, who are ineligible to participate. A total of
100,000 units is available for distribution in the discretion of
the committee. A participating employee is credited with cost-free
units, representing a corresponding number of Koppers common
stock. There is a ceiling of 5,000 units per person, and at the
termination of employment they become available for re-distribution. Each unit has most of the attributes of a share of stock.
Dividends earned by actual shares of stock and stock splits or
mergers are all reflected in the employee's unit account. Upon
his retirement, disability, or death, the employee receives in cash
in 40 quarterly installments not only such dividend accumulations
but also any market appreciation of the shares, computed as of
the time of retirement, death or disability, or as of any date within
three years thereafter at the option of the employee or his beneficiary, so long as the delayed computation is based on a market
price not exceeding the highest price reached by the stock between
the date of assignment of the unit and the date of termination of
employment. To be eligible for participation, the employee must
agree to remain with the company for at least five years from the
date units are first awarded to him (or until his retirement) to be
available for consultation for a period of ten years following
termination of his employment and to refrain from competing
with the company. The plan may be terminated at any time by
the Board of Directors prospectively, and if such termination
occurs within five years from its effective date, no market appreciation credit is to be made thereafter to the account of any participant. Furthermore, the Administrative Committee may at any
time prior to a participant's termination date reduce the number
or cancel all units standing to his credit to the extent that they
do not represent past dividend accumulations.
At the outset, the court drew a distinction between the question of existence of legal consideration for the plan and the
problem of the reasonableness of compensation, and thus steered
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away from much of the confusion present in this field. Indeed,
the failure to keep in focus the basic difference between the search
for the "missing peppercorn," which involves considerations of a
formal nature in the law of contracts, and the need for checking
the power of corporate directors and majority stockholders to
dispose of corporate assets without obtaining a fair equivalent for
the corporation as a matter of the law of corporations, has resulted
in the past in a unitary treatment of the entire subject," - - a practice tending to promote waste of argument and laxity in systematic
analysis. The importance of this distinction is further enhanced by
the difference in consequences dependent on the characterization
of the problem. For, if there is no legal consideration supporting
the particular compensation contract, minority shareholders may
rightfully complain that its performance would constitute a gift
of corporate property; but if there is formal consideration, the
courts will not ordinarily disturb the business judgment of the
directors (especially when confirmed by majority stockholder approval) as to the equivalency of the corporate expenditure and
anticipated benefits, unless the objector is able to show that "no
person of ordinary sound business judgment would say that the
consideration received (by the corporation) . . . was a fair ex-

change for (the compensation) granted.1 3

"This has been particularly so in Delaware. For example, in Rosenthal
v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 299, 306, 60 A.2d 106, 109 (1948),
a stock option case, the rule was stated as follows:

'While a corporation may under proper conditions grant an
option to its officers to purchase its stock, the corporation
must receive some consideration in return, and if that consideration is to be in the form of services, their value must bear
some reasonable relation to the value of the right given.
See also Kerbs v. California E. Airways, Inc., 33 DeL Ch. 69, 90 A.2d
652 (1952). On the other hand, Chancellor Seitz nearly separated the
two questions in Kaufman v. Shoenberg, 33 Del. Ch. 211, 220, 91 A.2d
786,791 (1952).
3
Kaufman v. Shoenberg, sapra note 12, at 220, 91 A.2d 786, 791.
". .. T]he court should only 'second guess' the corporate
determination if it be shocking in the light of the total picture
presented." Id. at 226, 91 A.2d 794.
See also the following cases: McPhail v. L. S. Starrett Co., 257 F.2d
388, 394 (1st Cir. 1958); McQuilen v. National Cash Register Co.,
112 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1940); Wyles v. Campbell, 77 F. Supp. 343,
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In the principal case, the main thrust of plaintiff's argument
was directed against the reasonableness of the market appreciation
feature of the plan." Since the directors had already obtained
majority stockholder approval, and in the absence of an allegation
of self-dealing or bad faith on the part of the directors in the
complaint,"5 there was a heavy burden on the plaintiff to show
349 (D. Del 1948); Gropper v. North Cent. Tex. Oil Co., 114 A.2d
231 (Del. CI. 1955); Schiff v. R.K.O. Pictures Corp., 104 A.2d 267
(DeL Ch. 1954); Fidanque v. American Maracaibo Co., 33 Del. Ch.
262, 279-80, 92 A.2d 311, 321 (1952); Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem.
Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 177, 179, 91 A.2d 57, 58 (1952); Kerbs v. California E. Airways, 33 DeL Ch. 69, 75 n.2, 90 A.2d 652, 656 n.2 (1952);
Davis v. Louisville Gas. & Elec. Co., 16 Del Ch. 157, 142 A. 654

(1928). Cf. H.
1946).

BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS

§ 76, at 193 (rev. ed.

In Lewis v. Hat Corp. of America, 150 A.2d 750, 754 (Del. Ch.
1959), the court stated that the allegations of excessive salaries do not

set forth that type of intracorporate action which is not subject to

stockholder ratification. Literally taken, this statement relinquishes all
judicial control over excessive compensation of corporate officers to the
detriment of minority stockholders. It is unlikely, however, that the
court meant to depart from so generally recognized a rule in a casual
way; and one may venture the guess that the court merely used too
broad language in emphasizing the limitations of judicial review in
this field.
1"Te question of legal consideration was not pressed by the plaintiff in
the principal case and it was summarily dismissed by the court. Lieberman v. Becker, supra note 11, at 598. If the dividend factor under the
plan was subject to the same termination and cancellation reservations
for the benefit of the corporation as was the market appreciation factor,
which it was not, the existence of legal consideration might have been
more earnestly at issue, since the corporation promise would have been
illusory. An interesting case on this point is Kaufman v. Shoenberg,
sapra note 12, at 222, 91 A.2d 792, where the court conceded that the
failure of the corporation to make a binding promise would render
the employment contract invalid, but it found consideration in that the
employee had received options immediately exercisable and also in
that the Board's power to cancel options in the future had to be exercised reasonably. A similar question was raised but not answered in
Frankel v. Donovan, 120 A.2d 311, 316 n.9 (DeL Ch. 1956). Cf.
McPhail v. L. S. Starrett Co., supra note 13, at 393, where it was stressed
that absence of consideration may make the contract unenforceable but
not illegal.
"5 The court felt that either of those elements would have been sufficient
to shift the burden of proof from the directors to the objector. Lieber-
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clearly the shortcoming of the plan. In his uphill fight, he borrowed heavily from Judge McNamee's arsenal against a similar
plan in Berkwitz v. Humphrey,'"when he charged that the market value of common stock is too speculative an element to form
a reasonable basis for determining executive compensation, and
that the plan, by imposing unlimited and indefinite liability on
the corporaton, went beyond the dictates of elementary prudence."
Starting from the premise that stock option compensation
plans are proper, the court persuasively rejected both the following contentions of plaintiff.
With reference to the reasonableness of the relation between
the amount of compensation and the value of services in the unit
plan, the court felt that a stock option, concededly proper, is
equally subject to the vagaries of the market. Assuming that the
plan is administered competently and in good faith, a guess of the
future prospects of the stock would normally be one of the factors
considered in assigning units. 8 Finally, the court by its silence
refused to ascribe any significance to the distinction drawn by the
plaintiff between stock options and unit assignments based on
the fact that the former requires capital investment on the part
of the employee with all the risks inherent in speculation while,
in the latter, the employee does not put in jeopardy any property
of his own.19 Such a distinction has little relevance in the present
context, but in any event the employee who has received an option
is in a position very similar to that of the unit holder, since he
pays nothing until he decides to exercise the option, thus enjoying
all the windfalls of rapid appreciation without any real risk of loss
of capital. As a holder of a valuable option at the time of appreman v. Becker, sapra note 11, at 601.
owSpra note 6, at 90-93.
"The plaintiff made no attempt to challenge the plan as involving the
issuance of stock options or shares of stock at the time the units were
assigned and therefore subject to all the formalities necessary for such
issuance. A similar argument by the plaintiff in the Berkwitz case failed
to impress the court, since the unit assignment involved no proprietary
interest, no voting rights, and no power of alienation, and required no
change in the capital structure of the corporation. Id. at 89.
"Lieberman v. Becker, supranote 11, at 600.
"Id. at 599.
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ciation, it is unlikely that he will meet with difficulty in obtaining
credit to put up the necessary capital before the sale of the stock.
Once he has exercised the option, any delay in selling the stock
is unrelated to the plan and involves independent speculation by
the employee. In fact, there is merit to the suggestion made'0 that
the unit plan is more reasonable and beneficial to the corporation
than the stock option alternative, at least to the extent that
it better insures the retention of the employee's services by not
subjecting him to the temptation of leaving the company after
realizing his market gains. Furthermore, the unit plan is less
geared to the individual wealth of the employee (which is usually
unrelated to his abilities) and more to the value of the services
of the employee to the particular corporation. From another angle,
the interests of minority stockholders are better protected in the
case of the unit plan, because such stockholders can always obtain
judicial relief in extreme cases of waste due to error in judgment
by the directors. Since Section 157 of the Delaware General Corporation Law provides that the judgment of directors as to consideration, and its sufficiency, for the issuance of rights or options
to purchase stock shall be conclusive in the absence of fraud,' and
since Section 15 2 of the same statute makes such judgment equally
conclusive with respect to the value of the consideration received
for the issuance of the stock itself' judicial interference with
director action is much more limited in the case of stock options
than in the case of other compensation arrangements, such as the
unit plan.'
The tax aspects of the unit plan also present decisive advantages
L. J. 147, 148 n.3 (1959).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157 (Supp. 1956). Cf. MONTANNA REV.
CODES ANN. § 15-801 (1955); N.Y. CoRp. LAW § 69; PA. STAT. ANN.

2020 OHIo ST.
21

tit. 15, § 2852-612 (1958).

nDEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 152 (1953).

'Section 157 has been interpreted to immunize only such corporate
director judgment as regards the reasonableness of what the corporation
received in exchange for the option and not to preclude judicial review

of the question of existence of legal consideration. Frankel v. Donovan,
supra note 14, at 316. Although Section 157 in terms applies only to
stock options, it serves as a good illustration of a more general principle
affecting other compensation plans, which calls for the exercise of the
utmost judicial restraint in reviewing the judment of corporate directors.
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for the corporation. The corporation may deduct from its own
gross income all payments under the unit plan as compensation to
employees,' provided that such compensation is not found unreasonably high, whereas it may not deduct the profits of employees made by the exercise of stock options and the subsequent
sale of the stock on the open market. 6 From the point of view of
the employee the unit plan may not have the capital gains treatment available in the case of restricted or qualified stock optionsf
but at least it allows substantial tax benefits by postponing the
receipt of compensation until a time when the employee is more
likely to belong to a lower income tax bracket.'
The general arguments that these stockless units differ materially from stock options in that they impose on the corporation
unlimited and indefinite liability have failed to sway the courts
in favor of the plaintiffs. In concluding that the liability assumed
by the corporation was not unreasonable, the courts took notice
of the various flexible procedures for termination of the entire
plan or for cancellation of the market appreciation factor in the
units of a particular individual, and that a substantial block of
unissued but authorized stock was set aside as a reserve. Indeed,
the courts implied that the question had been prematurely raised
REv. CODE of 1954, § 404(a)5; Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a) 12.
Pomeroy, Real ContingenciesImportant in Unqaalified Pension Plaaand Beware of Funding, 10 J. TAXAMTON 110 (1959); Shelmerdine,
Shadow Stock Deferred Compensation Arrangements, N. Y. U. 17th
INST. ON FED. TAX 933, 946 (1959). See also 3 CCH Stand. Fed.
Tax Rep. P. 2662.261; P-H Corporation Guide P. 25,076 at 25,367,
obs. 1, supra notes 1 through 4.
2sINT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 404(a), 162 (a) 1; Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)
1(b) and 1.162.7 (b) 3.
26
1INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 421 (a)2, 422.
2INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 421, 422. See also Shelmerdine, supra note
24, at 945.
HINT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 451; Treas. Reg. §§ 1.451-1 (a), 1.451-2 (a).
Cf. Shermerdine, supra note 24, at 945; P-H Corporation Guide
2INT.

P. 1731, at 25,076. The doctrines of constructive receipt or economic

benefit which would have made the credits currently taxable to the
employee are not applicable, owing to the contingent nature of his
rights. Rev. Rul. 60-31, INT. REv. BULL. No. 5, at 17. See also Pomeroy, supra note 24, at 111, and 3 CCH 1966 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. P
2662.263, 2697, e.g. 2.
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and that potential liability alone would not warrant judicial interference before it crystalized into actual amounts due, the payment
of which would constitute waste of corporate assets."9 In fact, the
liability assumed by the corporation under a unit plan is only
superficially more extensive than that under stock option arrangements.' When stock options are granted to employees, the corporation may either reserve an equal number of authorized but
unissued shares (or treasury shares), or wait until the options
are exercised. In the latter case, the shares needed may be either
purchased in the open market or then and there be authorized and
issued. If a corporation adopts a unit plan, it may similarly set
aside at the outset a reserve of shares equal to the number of units
assigned or wait until its obligation accrues and then use a sum of
money equal to the market value of the corresponding shares or
sell in the market newly authorized stock. In other words, in both
instances an adequate reserve of shares fully protects the corporation, and in the absence of such a reserve the unit plan corporation has either to spend an originally indefinite sum of money or
issue new stock. However, in stock options, only a certificate need
be issued, whereas in the "unit plan" cash must be available. Thus

if there is no market demand for stock, the "unit plan" company

will be adequately prepared by having saved up a stockpile of
shares, while in a "stock option" company there is complete financial safety by virtue of the stockpile of shares. Similarly, in
both instances the danger of the corporation being unable to meet
its obligations is extremely remote, since ex hypothesi the liability
of the corporation would increase with the market appreciation of
its stock and such appreciation would certainly make it easy for the
29See, e.g., Lieberman

v. Becker, sapranote 11, at 601.
"0See 72 HARv. L. REy. 375, 376 (1958). Contra, 28 U. CIN. L REv.
86, 91 (1959), where the view is expressed that the unit plan violates
one of the established principles of stock compensation, because when
a stockholder sells at a profit, he receives that profit from another's purchase at the open market, while the unit holder's gains come from the
corporate till and constitute an additional cost of operating the business.
It may be pointed out, however, that the gains of the stock option holder
who exercises his option and sells his stock at the open market are in

reality gains which would have accrued to the corporation had the
options not been granted and stock of the same amount been issued;
thus, the corporation foots the bill to the same exent in both cases.
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corporation to float a reasonable amount of new stock for the
purpose of raising the necessary funds. Although it is true that
most companies, both large and small, do hesitate to turn to the
open market to float a small amount of new stock because of
registration, publicity, and pre-emptive stock rights. These do make
sale of stock to the public in small quantities relatively infrequent.
However, the unit plan should make it easier for the corporation
to make plans for the discharge of its obligation since the date of
an employee's retirement is more predictable than the date he
will exercise an outstanding stock option.
In upholding the validity of the Koppers compensation scheme,
the court pursued the iron logic dictating that the unit plan, being
so similar to the admittedly valid stock option plan, should not be
treated differently in so far as legal consequences are concerned. If
one wishes to leave for a moment the narrow question at issue and
to reconsider the soundness of the rule allowing the use of the market price of stock as a measuring rod of incentive compensation, he
may be slightly disturbed by the wide range of discretion enjoyed
by directors and majority stockholders in this area, especially in
view of the modern trend toward more and more self-perpetuating
management groups. Tightening judicial controls, presently limited to situations where the incentive compensation plan, at its
inception, is so out of balance that no reasonable man would
have adopted it?1 or where a plan, reasonable on its face, has
produced a monstrosity of compensation in a particular case,n may
1See note 13 supra.
In the famous case of Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933), an incentive compensation plan centered around corporate profits, and thus
valid at its inception, had come to a point, by reason of the success
of the company, where the directors were receiving a lion's share from
the profits. The Supreme Court held that such excessive compensation
amounted in effect to a spoliation and waste of corporate property.
The Rogers rule has been followed in the over-whelming majority of
cases involving a similar question. It is subject, however, to qualifications which limit the number of situations where the courts will upset
corporate compensation arrangements. Thus:

(a) In passing upon the reasonableness of compensation determinable by reference to variable indexes, such as corporate profits, market
price etc., the courts will not treat the situation as if the arrangement
originally provided for the definite payment of the sum so determined

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol4/iss2/3
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not be the best answer. Instead, establishing a ceiling for market
appreciation which is either fixed in dollars and cents or determinable by reference to a percentage or multiple of some more
in a particular instance, but they will take into consideration the uncertainty of payment assumed by the employee at the time of the
adoption of the plan. McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., 27 F.
Supp. 639 (D. Md. 1939), affd, 112 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1940), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 695 (1940); Wyles v. Campbell, 77 F. Supp. 343,
350 (D. Del. 1948). In the words of the leading writers in the field:
Even though an option may represent large potential profits,
the courts have shown no inclination to regard the highest
potential profit as equivalent to fixed monetary compensation
and will hardly strike down the form of compensation for 'unreasonableness' merely because profits are greater than the
fixed salary which might otherwise have been paid.
G. WASHINGTON & V. RoTHscHILD, COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE
ExcunvE 123 (rev. ed. 1951).
(b) The courts have been refusing to strike down excessive compensation unless it reached the heights of incongruity or other circumstances made it clearly unjustifiable. Koplar v. Warner Bros. Pictures

Inc., 19 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del 1937); Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S. 2d
653, 669, (Sup. Ct. N. Y. County 1941), aff'd without opinion, 263
App. Div. 815, 32 N.Y.S. 2d 131 (1st Dept. 1941) ("Now even a
high-bracketer would deem these stipends municifent ... To others they
would seem immoral, inexcusable unequal . . . The figures . . . are
immense, staggeringly so. Even so, is that enough to compel the substitution of the Court's judgment for that of the stockholders? Larger
compensation has been judicially approved.") Gallin v. National City
Bank, 152 Misc. 679, 704, 273 N.Y.S. 87, 115 (Referee 1934), approved, 155 Misc. 880, 903, 281 N.Y.S. 795, 821 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1935) (The rule is established that directors of a corporation
acting as a body in good faith have a right to fix compensation of
executive officers for services rendered to the corporation, and that
ordinarily their decision as to the amount of compensation is final
except when the circumstances show oppression, fraud, abuse, bad faith
or other breach of trust.") Cf. Gamble v. Penn Valley Crude Oil Corp.,
104 A.2d 257, 262 (Del. Ch. 1954).
In other words:
The courts, while recognizing that compensation in very large
amounts may be excessive per se and a waste of corporate
funds, have found justification on the merits for allowing the
agreed upon amounts to stand, either by comparison with the
compensation of executives in other enterprises in the same
branch of industry, by finding that the board of directors
acted independently and in the exercise of its best business

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1967

13

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 4 [1967], Iss. 2, Art. 3

TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4, No. 2

reliable indicator such as salary or even corporate profits, may
allow an easy ascertainment of the validity of a particular plan in

advance. Another possible solution would call for shareholder
approval. If market appreciation is found objectionable as un-

reliable and substantially unrelated to the services of the employee,' (which is a highly debatable proposition especially in
situations like the present where the plan is a long-term arrangement), a search for a better index may prove fruitless35 unless one
is willing to limit oneself to the traditional favorite, corporate
profits.
PROGNOSIS FOR THE UNIT PLAN

The court's approval of the Koppers Deferred Compensation
Unit Plan as providing for compensation reasonably related to
the services of the employees and as not imposing potentially unlimited liability on the company, is strongly supported by the
rationale of decisions upholding the validity of stock option plans.
This result is particularly welcome in the principal case, since the
judgment or by concluding that the executives must be worth
their pay judging from the success with which the corporation
was managed.
G. WASHINGTON & V. ROTHScHILD, supra at 415-14.
An interesting comment by Justice Cardozo in his dissenting opinion
in the case of Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123, 150 (1933),
to the effect that shareholder assent to a compensation plan should
not be deemed to extend to situations where such compensation becomes in fact excessive at a later date, failed to grow roots in subsequent judicial opinions.
m1 G. HORNSTEiN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRAcTIcE 549 nAl (1959).
mSee Berkwitz v. Humphrey, 163 F. Supp. 78, 91 (N.D. Ohio 1958),
where Judge McNamee stressed the necessity of finding an index which
would fluctuate in response "solely" to the quality of the employee's
services. Since this is next to impossible, a substantial relation between
the index and the services should be deemed sufficient. The market
price of stock, while not reflecting precisely the value of employee's
services, is sensitively responsive to it, especially in modern times when
extraordinary manipulations of the market have been seriously curtailed by law.
" The book-value appreciation index, provided for in the Heinz Company
plan, which received the nod of Judge McNamee in the Berkwitz case,
may be more stable than market appreciation but certainly does not
reflect the growth prospects of the company, which prospects are closely
related to the quality of the services of its personnel.
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Koppers plan, which allowed realization of the market appreciation factor only at retirement, was effectively designed to prevent
employee market speculation and still give them an incentive for
staying with the company. Furthermore, the plan operated to the
tax benefit of the corporation and, to some extent, to that of the
employees. While incentive compensation geared to market appredation of company stock is sound in principle, some ceiling
to the benefits that may accrue to the employee, or some other
way of checking in advance the possibility of excessiveness, may
in some circumstances be desirable.
Despite all the considerations discussed, the unit plan can be
a great benefit to corporate management in their quest for a
scheme to adequately compensate executives."5 To some degree, it
may achieve an amalgamation of some of the choicest characteristics of stock option plans with the unique "unit allocation" technique of the unit plan. If conceived with clarity and used with
caution, the unit plan allows management to join together the
best of two worlds.
36The following are additional comparisons and contrasts between unit
plans and stock options:
a. The ....
unit plan" may offer less chance to grant employees a
"proprietary interest," because the employee is never forced (as through
expiration of an option) nor permitted (as through voluntary early
exercise of an option) to acquire an ownership interest in the employing company. Thus the "unit plan" lacks the employee proprietary interest of options, and the proprietary interest an employee receives is
often said to be an important justification for options.
b. The unit plan, since it pays off in cash, eliminates dilution of
present control In closely held companies, existing shareholders might
appreciate this advantage in the unit plan over stock option plans.
c. The unit plan, since it pays off in cash, obviates the need to increase authorized stock, to comply at any time with state or federal
blue sky and securities regulation laws, attendant publicity of corporate
affairs, etc.
d. As previously noted, the need to make a cash outlay is a significant factor against the unit plan.
e. The other significant drawback, as brought out in the text, is the
lack of capital gain treatment in unit plans.
f. A slight advantage of the unit plan might be safety from 16(b)
violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
g. Perhaps obvious, but worth mentioning is that unit plans are not
likely to be used by companies whose stock is not regularly quoted in
a securities market. This drawback is not present in option plans.
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